

JOHN KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

LEE HARVEY OSWALD KGB FILES

YELTSIN-CLINTON 1999 EXCHANGE

John Kennedy Assassination - Lee Harvey Oswald KGB Files

This collection is a set of KGB documents given to President Bill Clinton in 1999 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The files date from 1959 when Lee Harvey Oswald sought defection to the Soviet Union.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(Translation Division)

LS no. 0692061-1

ISA'S

Russian

Workers of the world, unite !

TOP SECRET

[Translator's note: All the Russian documents translated herein have been stamped "Declassified."]

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P251/14

To: Comrades Gromyko, Shelepin, Miterev, Georgadze,
Stepanov; the CP Central Committee of Byelorussia;
Comrade Tarasov, Chairman of the Byelorussian Economic Council

Regarding the application of US. national Lee Harvey Oswald for Soviet citizenship

1. Agree with the proposal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald, who has applied for Soviet citizenship, be granted the right of temporary sojourn in the Soviet Union for one year, and that the question of his permanent residency in the USSR and of his receiving Soviet citizenship be resolved upon the expiration of this period.
2. Have the Byelorussian Economic Council find employment for Oswald as an electrician; the Minsk City Council of Workers Deputies is to assign him a separate small apartment.
3. Instruct the Executive Committee of the Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR to appropriate five thousand rubles to furnish the apartment for Oswald and to provide an allowance of 700 rubles monthly for one year.

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[Translator's note: The caption on the left hand side of the page reads:
"To be returned within seven days to the First Sector of the General Section
of the Central Committee of the CPSU."]

Russian

[illegible words; 251-14]

Sent to the members of the Presidium of the
CC CPSU for a vote

Secret

Draft

RESOLUTION OF THE CC CPSU

Regarding the application of US. national Lee Harvey Oswald for Soviet citizenship

1. Agree with the proposal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that US. national Lee Harvey Oswald, who has applied for Soviet citizenship, be granted the right of temporary sojourn in the Soviet Union for one year, and that the question of his permanent residency in the USSR and of his receiving Soviet citizenship be resolved upon the expiration of this period.
2. Have the Byelorussian Economic Council find employment for Oswald as an electrician; the Minsk City Council of Workers Deputies is to assign him a separate small apartment.
3. Instruct the Executive Committee of the Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR to appropriate five thousand rubles to furnish the apartment for Oswald and to provide an allowance of 700 rubles monthly for one year.

For - M. Suslov

Secret

CC CPSU

U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald, who is in the USSR as a tourist, has sent an application to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for Soviet citizenship and for permanent residency in the USSR.

Lee Harvey Oswald (b. 1939), a student in his final year at an electrical trade school, came to the USSR on October 15 this year. Upon arriving in Moscow, he applied for Soviet citizenship. Because no decision had been reached on Oswald's request by the time his visa expired and he was to leave the USSR, Oswald tried to commit suicide by slitting a vein. After his recuperation he has kept insisting that he be given Soviet citizenship, and he refuses to leave the USSR. On October 31 he visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and said he renounced his American citizenship.

In view of the fact that individual foreigners who previously received Soviet citizenship (Sitrinell [?], Afshar [?]) left our country after living here awhile, and considering that Oswald has not been sufficiently examined as yet, it would be advisable to grant him the right of temporary sojourn in the USSR for one year and to provide him employment and housing. In such case, the question of Oswald's permanent residency in the Soviet Union and his receiving Soviet citizenship could be resolved upon the expiration of that period.

The draft of the resolution is enclosed. Please review it.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Chairman of the Committee for State Security
A. Gromyko A. Shelepin

November 27, 1959
No. 3471-sh

SECRET

[stamp reads: To be returned
to the General Section of the
Central Committee]

45256

CC CPSU

Please find enclosed a report on the sojourn of American tourist L.H. Oswald in Moscow.

Enc .: 1 page

Deputy Chairman of the Administration of Intourist
[s] B. Boychenko

November 11, 1959
No. 124. 31299[?]-s

REPORT

on the Sojourn of American Tourist L.H. Oswald in Moscow

From October 21 through October 28, Oswald was treated at Botkinskiy Hospital after he had tried to commit suicide by slitting a vein in his arm.

Professor Tratakovski, his attending physician, said in an interview with an Intourist interpreter that Oswald was of sound mind but very strong-willed, and if his request for permission to remain in the USSR were turned down again he might repeat his suicide attempt.

In the hospital building where Oswald was staying, one other American was receiving treatment at the same time. This person was visited by a friend, a staff member of the U.S. Embassy. The latter took an interest in Oswald and asked whether he was registered at the U.S.

Embassy and what had happened to him. Oswald, according to him, did not tell him anything.

On October 24, the Embassy called and asked when Oswald would be discharged from the hospital.

After his discharge Oswald was put up at the Metropol Hotel. On October 29 he was received at OVIR [section for visas and registration of foreign nationals], where he repeated his request for permission to stay in the USSR and receive Soviet citizenship. The head of OVTR permitted him to wait in Moscow until the final reply of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to his application.

In a conversation with the interpreter, Oswald stated that if the Supreme Soviet turned him down, he would not leave the USSR anyway and would keep applying to the Supreme Soviet until he achieved his goal. "I don't think the Supreme Soviet would be that cruel to me," he said.

On November 5, Oswald stated in a conversation with the interpreter that on October 3 1 he had visited the U.S. Embassy, renounced his American citizenship, and told them he would ask

the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to grant him Soviet citizenship. The Embassy staff member who had received him "did not express particular pleasure and replied that that was his business," and he communicated this at once to the journalists.

On November 1, 2, and 3 he was visited at the hotel by a number of journalists, including Stevens [?], but he refused to talk to them.

Acting Head of the EMO [?]
[s] P. Baranov

Senior Consultant [?]

[s] Belov

November 6, 1959
md-6

[stamp]

43256

/illegible stamp]

40563

[partially illegible stamp; dated October 21 [?], 1959]

99

To the Central Committee of the CPSU

U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald, who came to the USSR as a tourist on October 15 of this year, has applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for Soviet citizenship.

According to his application, Lee Harvey Oswald (b. 1939), a native of the United States, served with the occupation forces in Japan after graduating from a three-year U.S. Navy school, [sic]. Oswald writes in the application: "I request that I be granted citizenship in the Soviet Union because I am a communist and a worker. I have lived in a decadent capitalist society where the workers are slaves. I have no desire to go to any other country."

The visa for Oswald's stay in the USSR expires on October 21 of this year.

The Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR deems it inadvisable to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship.

In our opinion, there are no grounds for approving Oswald's request for Soviet citizenship and for permitting him to remain as a permanent resident in the Soviet Union.

Comrade K.Ye. Voroshilov agrees with this opinion.

Please give [further] instructions.

[Partially illegible handwritten note: "Added with proposals. Georgadze agrees. 10-23-59]

10-21 [?]-59 [s] Georgadze

MT-3

USSR

COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

SECRET

October 20, 1959

No. 4870/59 [?]

Moscow

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDUM
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

Comrade M.P. Georgadze

Re: no. 435 of October 17, 1959

The Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR deems it inadvisable to grant Soviet citizenship to Lee Harvev Oswald .

Enc .: application.

Deputy Chairman of the Committee for State Security
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

[s] A. Perepelitsyn

40563 [?]

MOSCOW

[Translator's note: The Russian text contained herein is a Russian translation of the note that Lee

Harvey Oswald wrote to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 16, 1959, requesting

Soviet citizenship. The translation, done by L. Postnikova, contains two major errors:

1. Oswald's statement "I have completed three years in the United States Marine Corps" is mistranslated as "I have graduated from a three-year U.S. naval school."
2. The phrase "in order to come to Russia for the express purpose of seeking citizenship here" is mistranslated as "in order to come to Russia and explain my desire to receive Soviet citizenship."

[partially illegible stamp]
45506
6th sector

To be sent to the members of the Presidium of the
CC CPSU, candidates for membership in the Presidium
of the CC CPSU, and the secretaries of the CC CPSU

[handwritten "2"]

November 23, 1963 A. Gromvko

Translation from English

U.S. Embassy
Moscow

November 23, 1963

Dear Mr. Gromyko:

I consider it my sad duty to inform you of the death of the President of the United States of America, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, which occurred on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. I would also like to inform you that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took the presidential oath at 3:39 PM on November 22, 1963 EST.

In accordance with our national customs, the Embassy will observe a thirty-day period of mourning.

His Excellency
A. A. Gromyko
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow

A book of condolences will be open at my residence on November 23, 24, and 25 between 12 and 1 PM and 3 and 5 PM

I am deeply grateful to you for the condolences you conveyed to me last evening on the telephone, and I have, of course, passed them on to my government.

Sincerely yours,
Foy D. Kohler

Translator: Makarov

Certified: [handwritten "Makarov"]

[handwritten: 1279 [?] 146121 3 TOP SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM

WASHINGTON 53927 07 30 23 XI 63

53928

Special no. 1967-1968

HIGHEST PRIORITY

At 16 hours 00 minutes, the U.S. telegraph agency reported that police in Dallas, Texas, had arrested U.S. national Lee H. Oswald, 24 years old, chairman of the local branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, on suspicion that he had assassinated Kennedy.

It is also reported that Oswald was in the USSR some time ago and is married to a Russian woman.

It was ascertained by checking at the consular section of the embassy that Oswald really did spend several years in Minsk, where he married Soviet citizen Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova (b. 1941). In June 1962, they returned to the U.S. In March 1963, Prusakova applied to return with her daughter to the USSR for permanent residency.

The KU [?] of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR (letter no. KU-USA-540058-24518 of October 7, 1963) reported that her application was rejected.

The consular section of the embassy has the correspondence between Prusakova and Oswald regarding her return to the USSR. The last letter from Lee Oswald was dated November 9 (the text was transmitted on the line [sic] of nearby neighbors).

It is possible that the U.S. authorities may ask us to familiarize them with the correspondence in our possession.

The U.S. authorities are aware of the existence of this final correspondence, since it was conducted through official mail.

Inasmuch as there is nothing that compromises us in this correspondence, we might agree to do this as a last resort (after removing our internal correspondence with the MFA).

Please give instructions on this matter .

Radio and television, which have interrupted all other programming and are broadcasting only reports relating to the murder of the President, are alluding more and more often to the fact that the assassin was evidently connected with "extreme leftist elements."

November 22, 1963
A. Dobrynin

[handwritten: 14619 [?] 23/8 [?] 3

CIPHER TELEGRAM

WASHINGTON 53939 8 30 23

53928

Special no. 1969

TOP SECRET

XI 63

HIGHEST PRIORITY

In connection with Kennedy's death we would consider it advisable :

1. to send condolences on behalf of N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev to the new president L. Johnson and to Kennedy's wife, as well as [condolences] on behalf of A. A. Gromyko to Rusk;

2. for one of the members of the government, e.g., A. A. Gromyko, to visit Kohler and

convey condolences;

3. possibly to send one of the members of the government to the U.S. for Kennedy's funeral. But this matter can be resolved somewhat later, when the funeral arrangements have become clear. More information will be provided .

On my own behalf I have sent condolences to the president's wife, to Rusk, and to R. Kennedy.

November 22, 1963

A. Dobrynin

Workers of the world, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P 125/1

TOP SECRET

To Comrades Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Podgomy,

Gromyko, Stepanov, Georgadze, Mikoyan

Excerpt from Protocol no. 125 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on November 23, 1963

On Measures to be Taken in Connection with the Murder of US. President J.F. Kennedy

1. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

USSRN.S. Khrushchev to U.S. President L.B. Johnson (appendix 1).

2. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev to U.S. President L.B. Johnson (appendix 2).

3. Approve the text of the telegram from Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy's wife, Jacqueline Kennedy (appendix 3).

4. Approve the text of the telegram from N.P. Khrushcheva to Jacqueline Kennedy (appendix 4).

5. Approve the text of the telegram from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko to U.S. Secretary of State D. Rusk (appendix 5).

6. The telegrams mentioned in paragraphs 1-5 are to be published in the press.

7. Instruct Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko to visit the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, F. Kohler, and convey to him the deep condolences of the Soviet government in connection with the heinous assassination of U.S. President J.F. Kennedy.

A report of this is to be published in the press.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125
Appendix 1

To U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington,

The White House

I was deeply saddened by the news of the tragic death of the eminent statesman, the

President of the United States of America, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

John F. Kennedy's death is a serious blow to all people who cherish the cause of peace and Soviet-American cooperation.

The heinous assassination of the U.S. president at a time when, through the efforts of peace-loving peoples, there were visible signs of reduced international tension and new prospects for improved relations between the USSR and the U.S., evokes the indignation of the Soviet people towards the perpetrators of this vile crime.

My personal meetings with President Kennedy have left me with a memory of him as a broad-minded statesman who took a realistic view of the situation and who strove to find ways to resolve through negotiations the international problems that presently divide the world.

The Soviet government and the Soviet people share the grief of the American people over this great loss and express the hope that the search to resolve issues in dispute~to which President Kennedy contributed a great deal-- will be continued in the interest of peace and for the good of all humanity.

Please accept, Mr. President, my personal condolences.

N. Khrushchev

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Moscow, the Kremlin
November , 1963

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125
Appendix 2

To U.S. President Lydon B. Johnson

Washington,

The White House

I have just learned of the heinous assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

I am deeply saddened by this news. The Soviet people share the grief of the American people in connection with the serious loss that has befallen them— the tragic death of an eminent statesman in the prime of life.

Please accept my most sincere condolences.

L. Brezhnev

Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125

Appendix 3

To Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy

Washington,

The White House

It was with a feeling of deep personal sorrow that I learned of the tragic death of your husband. President of the United States John F. Kennedy.

He was greatly respected by all those who knew him, and I shall always remember my meetings with him.

Please accept my most sincere condolences and heartfelt sympathy in the grief that has befallen you.

N. Khrushchev

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125
Appendix 3

To Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy

Washington,

The White House

It was with a feeling of deep personal sorrow that I learned of the tragic death of your husband. President of the United States John F. Kennedy.

He was greatly respected by all those who knew him, and I shall always remember my meetings with him.

Please accept my most sincere condolences and heartfelt sympathy in the grief that has befallen you.

N. Khrushchev

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125

Appendix 4

To Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy

Washington,

The White House

I am shaken by the tragic death of your husband, President of the United States John F . Kennedy. At this sad time, please accept my sincere condolences and sympathy for you and your entire family.

Nina Petrovna Khrushcheva

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125

Appendix 4

To Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy

Washington,

The White House

I am shaken by the tragic death of your husband. President of the United States John F. Kennedy. At this sad time, please accept my sincere condolences and sympathy for you and your entire family.

Nina Petrovna Khrushcheva

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125
Appendix 5

To U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Washington,

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, my sincere condolences on the tragic death of President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy at the hands of an assassin.

It is my hope that the process of reducing international tension beginning with the signing of the Moscow Treaty, which was valued highly by the late president, will be continued and will do honor to the memory of the deceased.

A. Gromyko

Re: Paragraph 1 of Protocol no. 125
Appendix 5

To U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Washington,

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, my sincere condolences on the tragic death of President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy at the hands of an assassin.

It is my hope that the process of reducing international tension beginning with the signing of the Moscow Treaty, which was valued highly by the late president, will be continued and will do honor to the memory of the deceased.

A. Gromyko

[handwritten: 125 10
43476

To comrade V.N. Malin [illegible words]

I am sending [for finalization] the draft of the Resolution of the CC CPSU on measures be taken] in connection with the departure of comrade A.I. Mikoyan to the United States. Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has endorsed this decision.

[s] V. Zorin

November 23, 1963

[illegible name]

1 1-23-63 [illegible name]

Top Secret
Draft

RESOLUTION OF THE CC CPSU

On Measures [to be Taken] in Connection with the Funeral of U.S. President J.F. Kennedy

1. Send First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, comrade A.I. Mikoyan, to Washington to take part in the funeral of U.S. President John F. Kennedy.
2. Together with A.I. Mikoyan, send to Washington comrades M.N. Smimovskiy, V. V. Smolyanichenko, V.M. Sukhodrev, and three escorts.
3. Instruct the Main Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (comrade E.F. Loginov) to assign a special aircraft to fly comrades A.I. Mikoyan and the persons

accompanying him to Washington and back.

4. The expenses for the travel of comrade A.I. Mikoyan and the persons accompanying him are to be charged to the reserve fund of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

November 23, 1963

No. 3371/GS

43476

Top Secret

/Partially illegible stamp: CC CPSU

43690

2640 Ya. 1963

First Sector

To be returned to the General Section
of the CC CPSU/

CC CPSU

The American press has disseminated various slanderous fabrications regarding some Soviet and Cuban "connections" of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was charged by the U.S. authorities with the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy and who was then himself killed under mysterious circumstances. In addition, some organs of the American press are attempting to support their insinuations by referring to the fact that Oswald lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959 through June 1962.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the KGB of the Council of Ministers of

the USSR have prepared a statement for the Soviet press to debunk these allegations by the American media. The thrust of the draft statement is that the murder of Oswald himself reveals now even more clearly the identity of the groups who are behind President Kennedy's assassination and who are obviously trying to cover up their tracks. The question of whether it is advisable to publish such a statement requires special consideration, the final decision being contingent on how the investigation of the circumstances surrounding Kennedy's assassination

turns out.

If the U.S. authorities request the Soviet embassy in Washington for information concerning Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, they could be provided with a relevant report this matter.

The draft of the resolution is appended. Please review it.

[s] A. Gromyko

[s] V. Semichastnyy

November 25, 1963

No. 03381/GS

Secret. Copy 1

Draft

RESOLUTION OF THE CC CPSU

On Measures To be Taken to Discredit the Slanderous Fabrications in the American Press Regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's "Connections" with the Soviet Union

1. Approve the draft of the statement for publication in the Soviet press in reply to the allegations by the American press (Appendix 1).
2. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Washington on the possible transmission to the U.S. authorities of a report on Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union

(Appendix 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CC

K03381/GS

43690

Appendix 1

ON FABRICATIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

In the past few days the world has witnessed a monstrous crime. The U S. President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, has died at the hand of an assassin. This heinous crime has evoked the rightful indignation of all decent people, all those interested in preserving and strengthening peace.

The assassin's bullet cut down President Kennedy at a moment when there were visible prospects in the world for a reduction in international tension, and trust had begun to appear in relations between states. It is well known how fiercely the late president of the U.S. was attacked for his steps aimed at resolving international disputes by reaching agreement between countries, particularly the USSR and the U.S.

Finally, it is no accident that certain groups are now attempting to cover up their tracks and conceal the real perpetrators of this foul crime. The more that events connected with the assassination of President Kennedy unfold, the easier it is to discern the identity of those who directed the assassin's hand. Now that Lee Harvey Oswald, accused of murdering the President, has himself been killed under mysterious circumstances, one can see even more clearly the absurdity and malice of the slanderous fabrications in certain organs of the American press, which are trying to establish Oswald's "connection" with either the Soviet Union or Cuba, using the fact that he spent some time in the Soviet Union as the basis for their insinuations.

43690

As we have learned, U.S. national L.H. Oswald came to the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist, like thousands of other U.S. citizens. While in Moscow he applied for Soviet citizenship. Since the grounds for accepting this request were insufficient, his application was rejected. After making persistent appeals Oswald was permitted to stay in the Soviet Union temporarily with the status of a foreign national, as is customarily done in regard to other foreigners as well. He lived and worked in Minsk a while and got married there to a Soviet citizen. During his stay in the Soviet Union he kept in touch with the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

In 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and departed for the U.S. in June with his wife and child, after receiving permission from the American embassy in Moscow, to which he had applied for this permission.

We also know from reports by U.S. authorities that Oswald served in the U.S. Marine Corps in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan, and after being discharged from the army [sic] began traveling in European countries. As we noted above, in October 1959 he appeared in the Soviet Union as a tourist.

Those are the facts relating to the arrival, stay, and departure from the Soviet Union of U.S. national L.H. Oswald. All this shows the malicious nature of the anti-Soviet insinuations being spread by certain U.S. newspapers in connection with Oswald's arrest. All those who honor the memory of President J.F. Kennedy and his approach to resolving serious international problems understand what groups are interested in concocting such slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban fabrications, and reject them with contempt.

Hardly anyone gave credence to those fabrications even when the first reports came out regarding the circumstances of President Kennedy's assassination. But now that a new shot has been fired in Dallas, aimed this time at a person accused of murdering the U.S. president, such fabrications cannot but elicit a bitter smile and understandable indignation not only outside the United States but among all decent Americans, who have the right to expect that justice will be meted out to the real murderers and organizers of this shameful crime. Who does not realize that the physical destruction of Oswald is an additional link in the chain of crimes leading to the real masterminds of President Kennedy's assassination, who stop at nothing in their efforts to mislead the investigation and put it on a false trail?

The assassins of the U.S. President and their instigators should be sought where they are, where the assassination was carried out; that is the opinion of all right-minded persons, who share with the American people feelings of sorrow and indignation over the tragic death of President John F. Kennedy.

(TASS)

Secret. Copy 1
Draft

Appendix 2

Washington

The Soviet ambassador

In the event that the U.S. authorities request you to provide information the embassy has about Lee Harvey Oswald, who was in the USSR, you can give them the following information on this matter.

“According to information available to the Embassy, U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald (b. 1939), a native of New Orleans, Louisiana, arrived in the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist. While in Moscow he told the Soviet authorities of his desire to remain in the USSR as a permanent resident and requested the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to grant him Soviet citizenship. Oswald’s request was rejected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

As a result of Oswald’s persistent requests, he was allowed to stay temporarily in the Soviet Union with the status of a foreign national. While in the Soviet Union Oswald lived in Minsk, where he worked at a local radio factory. In April 1961 Oswald married Soviet citizen Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova (b. 1941). In June 1962 Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and departed for the United States with his family after receiving permission from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In early 1963 the Oswald family requested permission from the Soviet embassy in Washington to settle permanently in the USSR. That request was rejected.”

[handwritten: 1087 [?] 26/[illegible numbers] TOP SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy no. 12

WASHINGTON 54414 11 25 26 XI 63

54415

Special no. 2000-2001

HIGHEST PRIORITY

CC CPSU

Immediately after the requiem at Arlington Cemetery, I and other foreign representatives who attended Kennedy's funeral went to the White House, where the late president's widow, Jacqueline Kennedy, had arranged a reception. The guests were greeted by members of the Kennedy family, but Jacqueline herself did not show up until the end of the reception. Those in attendance filed by the late president's spouse and shook her hand. It struck us that Jacqueline Kennedy, who exchanged only two or three words with the persons introduced to her, looked very calm and even appeared to be smiling. However, when we were presented to her and when

we conveyed our heartfelt condolences to her on behalf of Nina Petrovna, N.S. Khrushchev, and

Rada and Alyosha Adzhubey, as well as on behalf of the Soviet government, the Soviet people and myself, Jacqueline Kennedy said, with great emotion and nearly sobbing: "I am sure that Chairman Khrushchev and my husband could have been successful in the search for peace, and

they were really striving for that. Now you must continue this endeavor and bring it to completion."

We replied that we fully shared her opinion and agreed that both sides should continue striving to develop friendly relations between our countries for the benefit of peace throughout the world. We emphasized our sorrow over the misfortune that had befallen her.

In conclusion, Jacqueline Kennedy expressed her sincere gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev and us for our sympathy and for the special trip we had made to the United States to attend her husband's funeral.

She said all this with inspiration and deep emotion. During the entire conversation she clasped my hand with her two hands, trying to convey as convincingly as possible her feelings and thoughts regarding the cause of peace, to which her husband had devoted his efforts, and her own desire that our countries complete this endeavor.

Her fortitude is most impressive.

A. Mikoyan
November 25, 1963

[handwritten: 1088/48121 [?] 11/26/1963 TOP SECRET 46

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy no. 12

WASHINGTON 54416 11 30 26 XI 63

54419 54417

Special no. 2002-2004

HIGHEST PRIORITY

CC CPSU

Today, during the President's reception, I had a number of brief conversations with U.S. officials.

In the remarks of these persons, two things are worth noting:

1. All of them (Rusk, Thompson, disarmament agency director Foster, high-ranking officials from the State Department), in addition to expressing their deep appreciation for the Soviet government's decision to send its special representative to Kennedy's funeral, made a point of saying from the outset they were sure that President Kennedy's policy on Soviet-U.S. relations, as well as U.S. foreign policy in general, would be kept [the same] under the new president—Lyndon Johnson.

2. In his conversation with me, Thompson pointedly touched on an issue he had discussed yesterday with comrade Dobrynin—the commentaries in the Soviet press concerning the

assassination of President Kennedy, particularly the circumstances surrounding the investigation of this entire matter.

The gist of Thompson's comments was that the emphasis given in the Soviet press to the involvement of extreme right-wing circles in Kennedy's assassination (and then in Oswald's murder) complicates the situation of those in the U.S. who favor improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, because the U.S. press immediately counters such statements with assertions of Oswald's "communist and Cuban connections."

I told Thompson we did not want to make any complications; however, neither could we ignore a situation where the U.S. government had not yet investigated all the circumstances surrounding the assassination, but the U.S. media were senselessly reproaching us and Cuba in connection with Kennedy's murder.

Thompson replied he was aware of that, but asked me to understand his remarks. The government is now investigating all the particulars of the case, Thompson said, and it's in our common interest to see that the Soviet press confine itself to setting forth the facts and refrain from "premature conclusions" until the end of the investigation, since this was only playing into

the hands of right-wingers who were using this to fan anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria.

Judging from everything, the U.S. government does not want to involve us in this matter, but neither does it want to get into a fight with the extreme rightists; it clearly prefers to consign the whole business to oblivion as soon as possible. Our reaction to these murders has already played its role. The President stated today publicly that a thorough investigation would be carried out.

I believe that in further statements by our press, this point should be taken into account. This will help weaken attempts to foment an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign.

A. Mikoyan
November 25, 1963

[handwritten: 1093/14933 [?] 11/28/1963 TOP SECRET 57

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy no. 12

Special no. 2034

CC CPSU

On November 26 in the White House, before we were ushered into the Oval Office, comrade Sukhodrev was approached by White House Press Secretary Salinger, who asked him unofficially to convey to comrade N.S. Khrushchev the sincere gratitude of the President's friends and all the White House employees for comrade Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. embassy in Moscow to honor in person the memory of the late president. He emphasized that this gesture had made a great and very good impression on all the White House employees who had known Kennedy intimately and worked closely with him. Salinger also thanked [us] for the telegrams of

condolence and for our special trip to the United States to attend Kennedy's funeral. He said all this with great sincerity and emotion.

A. Mikoyan
November 27, 1963

[handwritten number: 59]

Workers of the world, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. PI 25/3 9

TOP SECRET

Excerpt from Protocol no. 125 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on November 28, 1963

Comrade A.I. Mikoyan's Report about His Trip to the United States

Approve the activities of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
comrade A.I. Mikoyan, who went to the United States in November 1963 to attend the funeral of
U.S. President John F. Kennedy, and during meetings with the new U.S. president, L. Johnson.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

Workers of the world, unite !

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P 126/48

To comrades Brezhnev and Gromyko

Excerpt from Protocol no. 126 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on November 28, 1963

Concerning a request by a New York Times correspondent for permission to travel to
Minsk to collect information about Oswald

- 1 . Travel to Minsk by New York Times correspondent Tanner or by other foreign
correspondents to collect information about Oswald's stay there is to be considered inadvisable.
2. If the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times makes another request, the MFA
of the USSR is to be instructed to report that the facts relating to Oswald's temporary stay in
and
departure from the Soviet Union are known to the U.S. government, thus there is no need to
travel to Minsk to collect information about Oswald.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

CC CPSU

Tanner, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, citing instructions from his
editors, has requested the Press Office of the MFA of the USSR for permission to travel to
Minsk

in order to collect information about the stay there of L.H. Oswald, who was accused of assassinating President Kennedy. Tanner also requests information about Oswald, particularly about the letters he sent (according to the New York Times editors) to members of the Soviet government.

In accordance with the existing procedure, foreign correspondents are to arrange for departure from Moscow to other cities in the USSR through the Press Section of the MFA of the USSR and the Office for Visas and Registration of Aliens (OVIR).

Refusal to grant Tanner permission to travel to Minsk might be looked upon as an attempt to conceal certain facts relating to Oswald's stay in the USSR.

At the same time, a trip by Tanner to Minsk (and perhaps by other correspondents following his example, if they were allowed) would enable correspondents to directly question people who had worked with Oswald or come into contact with him or his wife and to collect materials for biased reports, which would add new fuel to the controversy surrounding Oswald and his stay in the USSR. In the past few days after the assassination, judging from press reports, Oswald has receded into the background and the anti-Soviet furor is gradually beginning to subside.

Taking all this into account, the MFA of the USSR and the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR deem it advisable to delay granting Tanner permission to travel to Minsk. If Tanner makes another request to the Press Office of the MFA, he could be told orally that the facts pertaining to Oswald's temporary stay in and departure from the USSR are known to the U.S. Government, thus there is no need for any additional collection of information.

If other foreign correspondents request permission to travel to Minsk, the response shall be that it is not advisable at present to permit such travel.

The draft resolution is appended. Please review it

Original signed. Original signed:

A. Gromyko V. Semichastnyy

November 27, 1963
3412/GS

Certified: [illegible signature]

Translation from English

New York Times
Moscow Bureau

November 26, 1963

To the head of the Press Office
of the MFA of the USSR

Dear Mr. Zamyatin:

As you know, the New York Times has been calling very insistently all this time for a clarification of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of President Kennedy and Lee Harvey Oswald, as well as for the publication of all materials relating to this tragic event. This morning, Pravda cited our editorial and reports on this matter by James Reston and Anthony Lewis of our Washington bureau.

In the same vein, the editor of my newspaper has ordered me to shed as much light as possible on the particulars of Oswald's life in the Soviet Union.

He has requested me to go to Minsk in order to find out what can be ascertained about the years Oswald spent there. He has also asked me to inquire of the Soviet authorities whether they would be willing to provide the New York Times any information they might have about Oswald. It has been reported, for example, that he wrote personal letters to members of the Soviet government, including Premier Khrushchev.

I would like to ask your help in accomplishing this task— in receiving permission to travel to Minsk, in getting the cooperation of the local authorities there, and in transmitting my request for information about Oswald to the competent authorities here in Moscow.

I am sure you know my paper well enough to realize that we are not sensation hunters, and that this request is being made solely to put an end to rumors and half-truths.

I look forward to your prompt reply.

Sincerely yours,

Henry Tanner

Head of the Moscow Bureau
of the New York Times

Translator: G. Loginov

[Handwritten number: 72]

Top Secret. Copy no. 2

Appendix 2

Draft

MEXICO

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

665. I agree with you that you should visit the MFA of Mexico (the minister or his deputy) and say, referring to reports in the press, that Oswald requested the consular division of the Soviet embassy in Mexico for a visa to enter the USSR, that the procedure for obtaining entry visas was explained to him at the consular division, and that afterwards he no longer contacted the Soviet embassy. According to information available at the embassy, the request for the entry of Oswald and his family into the USSR that he made at the Soviet embassy in Washington was turned down.

You can reply in the same vein to other relevant questions by members of the Mexican and foreign press.

46] [illegible handwritten number]

Workers of the world, unite !

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P126/87[?]

TOP SECRET

To comrades Brezhnev and Gromyko

Excerpt from Protocol no. 126 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on November 29, 1963

Concerning the transmittal to the Americans of photocopies of Oswald's correspondence with
the
Soviet embassy in the U.S.

Approve the appended text of instructions to Soviet ambassador in Washington, comrade
A.F. Dobrynin.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

[Handwritten number at top: 77]

Re: Paragraph 37 of Protocol no. 126
Top Secret

WASHINGTON

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

2005. I agree with you. You may send Rusk photocopies of the correspondence between the embassy and Oswald, including his letter of November 9, but without waiting for a request by the U.S. authorities. When sending the photocopies, say that the letter of November 9 was not received by the embassy until November 18; obviously it had been held up somewhere. The embassy had suspicions about this letter the moment it arrived: either it was a forgery or was sent as a deliberate provocation. The embassy left Oswald's letter unanswered.

[handwritten: 1077/4367 [?] [illegible] TOP SECRET [illegible]

46

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[handwritten: 136 37 Copy do.

WASHINGTON 54607 9 40 27 XI 63

54419 54417

Special no. 2005

HIGHEST PRIORITY

Please note Oswald's letter of November 9, the text of which was transmitted to Moscow over the line [?] of nearby neighbors.

This letter was clearly a provocation : it gives the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own. It was totally unlike any other letters the embassy had previously received from Oswald. Nor had he ever visited our embassy himself.

The suspicion that the letter is a forgery is heightened by the fact that it was typed, whereas the other letters the embassy had received from Oswald before were handwritten.

One gets the definite impression that the letter was concocted by those who, judging from everything, are involved in the President's assassination. It is possible that Oswald himself wrote the letter as it was dictated to him, in return for some promises, and then, as we know, he was simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.

The competent U.S. authorities are undoubtedly aware of this letter, since the embassy's correspondence is under constant surveillance. However, they are not making use of it for the

time being. Nor are they asking the embassy for any information about Oswald himself; perhaps they are waiting for another moment.

The question also arises as to whether there is any connection now between the wait-and-see attitude of the U.S. authorities and the ideas conveyed by Thompson (though he himself may not be aware of this connection) on the desirability of some restraint on the part of the Soviet press and gradually hushing up the entire matter of Kennedy's assassination. Perhaps that is exactly what the federal authorities were inclined to do when they learned all the facts and realized the danger of serious international complications if the interested U.S. groups, including the local authorities in Dallas, continued to fan the hysteria over the "leftist" affiliations of Kennedy's assassin and the exposes we would have to issue in this case.

The main question now is: should we give the U.S. authorities Oswald's last letter if they ask for our consular correspondence with him (there is nothing else in it that could be used to compromise us). After weighing all the pros and cons, we are inclined to pass on this letter as well to the authorities if they request all the correspondence, because if we don't pass it on, the organizers of this entire provocation could use this fact to try casting suspicion on us.

Please confirm [receipt].

Agreed upon with A.I. Mikoyan.

November 26, 1963
A. Dobrynin

[handwritten number: 111]

[handwritten: 1386/1528 [illegible] TOP SECRET [illegible] 46

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy no.

WASHINGTON 55948 8 35 5 XI 63

55946 55949

Special no. 2086-2088

URGENT

I had a meeting with Thompson today at his request.

Thompson said that Jacqueline Kennedy, the late president's wife, had asked that I forward her personal letter to N.S. Khrushchev .

Thompson noted she had transmitted this letter to him through Bundy. Nobody knows anything more about her letter, although President Johnson, too, has apparently been informed about the transmission of the letter (but not about its content). Rusk "is not yet aware of this." Thompson also said that he personally was unfamiliar with the content of the letter itself.

The envelope was slightly glued in one spot. The entire letter was not typed, but written from beginning to end in the handwriting of Jacqueline Kennedy, which is usually considered here

to be a sign of particular respect for the addressee. She also personally addressed the letter.

The

letter is written on small pages and stamped "White House."

The letter reads as follows:

“White House, December 1, 1963.

Dear Mr. Chairman-President:

I would like to thank you for sending Mr. Mikoyan as your representative to my husband's funeral.

He looked so upset when he approached me, and I was very touched by this.

I tried that day to tell you some things through him, but it was such a horrible day for me that I do not know if my words were received as I wanted them to be.

Therefore now, on one of the last nights I will spend in the White House, in one of the last letters I will write on this White House stationary, I would like to write my message to you.

I am sending it only because I know how much my husband was concerned about peace [translator's note: the Russian word “mir” used here can mean either “peace” or “the world,” but the context seems to indicate that she meant “peace.”] and how important the relations between you and him were to him in this concern. He often cited your words in his speeches: “In the next war, the survivors will envy the dead.”

You and he were adversaries, but you were also allies in your determination not to let the world be blown up. You respected each other and could have dealings with each other. I know that President Johnson will make every effort to establish the same relations with you.

The danger troubling my husband was that war could be started not so much by major figures as by minor ones.

Whereas major figures understand the need for self-control and restraint, minor ones are sometimes moved rather by fear and pride. If only in the future major figures could still force minor ones to sit down at the negotiating table before they begin to fight!

I know that President Johnson will continue the policy my husband believed in so deeply—the policy of self-control and restraint—and he will need your help.

I am sending you this letter because I am so deeply mindful of the importance of the relations that existed between you and my husband, and also because you and Mrs. Khrushchev were so kind in Vienna.

I read that she had tears in her eyes as she was coming out of the American embassy in Moscow after signing the book of condolences. Please tell her "thank you" for this.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Kennedy."

In our opinion, it would be good if Nikita Sergeevich, and possibly also Nina Petrovna, replied to her with a personal letter. Perhaps it would also be advisable to consider the possibility of an unofficial invitation to Jacqueline Kennedy, e.g, from Nina Petrovna and Rada, to come with her children to our country, say the summer of next year, for a vacation on the Black Sea.

Such a step by our side would make a very good impression on American public opinion and on U.S. government circles as well. Moreover, it would also be useful to maintain contacts with the Kennedy family.

December 4, 1963

A. Dobrynin

Workers of the world, unite !

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. PI 26/1 16

TOP SECRET

To comrades Brezhnev, Podgomyi, Gromyko, and Semichastnyy

Excerpt from Protocol no. 126 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on December 10, 1963

Concerning the reply to U S. Secretary of State Rusk's request for the reasons for the refusal to
grant Soviet citizenship to U.S. national Oswald.

Approve the draft of the instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Washington regarding
this matter (appended).

SECRETARY OF THE CC

1-nk

w

Re. Paragraph 1 16 of Protocol no. 126
Top Secret

WASHINGTON

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

2054. Concerning Rusk's request to tell him the reasons why the Soviet authorities
refused to grant Oswald Soviet citizenship, you can report the following to Rusk orally:

"The Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws grant specific rights to Soviet citizens and
impose corresponding obligations on them. In reviewing an application for Soviet citizenship, the
competent authorities of the Soviet Union consider first of all the extent to which the applicant
can fulfill the obligations of a citizen of the USSR and enjoy the rights granted to him. The
reasons why a particular individual seeks Soviet citizenship are also taken into account.

The competent Soviet authorities who reviewed Oswald's application did not find
sufficient grounds to conclude that he met the requirements set forth in the Constitution and
laws
of the USSR for Soviet citizens. Oswald's motives for submitting the application were likewise

unclear. The fact that Oswald criticized the country of which he is a citizen could not, of course, be a decisive factor in the review of his application.

For the aforesaid reasons, Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship was rejected."
Notify us by telegraph when instructions have been carried out.

[handwritten number: 113]

[handwritten: 1062U5124 ciph /12-1-63 TOP SECRET [illegible] 46

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[handwritten: 126 116] Copy no. 12

WASHINGTON 55380 8 50 1 XII 63

55381 55382

Special no. 2054-2056

URGENT

Today I met Rusk and handed him photocopies of the embassy's correspondence with Oswald , commenting appropriately on his final letter of November 9 (your special no. 1328).

Rusk thanked me for turning over these documents, saying he greatly appreciated the Soviet side's initiative in this matter. In addition. Rusk inquired if he could make this correspondence available to the newly formed presidential special commission chaired by Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren .* I replied that we left it totally to his discretion whether to present this material to anyone, as we were sure he would properly appreciate our step and would act appropriately.

Rusk thanked me again for the photocopies. It was evident that Rusk was quite unprepared for this step on our part, while at the same time (judging from his general behavior) he was pleased with this development.

[Translator's note: This sentence, like several other sentences and paragraphs in what follows, is marked with a link in the left margin]

Rusk asked me, if I could, to find out in Moscow the reasons why the Soviet authorities had refused to grant Soviet citizenship to Oswald when he was still living in the Soviet Union. I promised to forward his request. Please instruct me how to answer Rusk .

Rusk noted in conclusion that he hoped for the Soviet side's cooperation if the Warren Commission had any requests or queries relating to its investigation. He, Rusk, would then want to turn to me confidentially.

Rusk also said he wanted to use our meeting to touch on certain other matters unofficially.

1. Rusk informed me that yesterday President Johnson had received FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] director Halaby and instructed him to meet with Soviet representatives for a final settlement of technical issues related to a future agreement on the establishment of a New York-Moscow air route. The U.S. embassy in Moscow has been instructed to consult the MFA of the USSR on this matter. Halaby would be ready to come to Moscow December 10-11.

Rusk then noted that this entire idea belonged to him, since, apart from the issue itself, he thought it important to show that business was continuing under the new president in the same manner as under J. Kennedy. President Johnson agreed with this, according to Rusk.

2. Rusk then mentioned his meetings with A A. Gromyko in New York and Washington at which he had raised the issue of the military budget. "I think," he told me. "that soon, in about 10-15 days. I will be able to tell you the amount the U.S. government plans to appropriate for the military in next year's fiscal budget. It will not be larger than the present amount and might even be less ." Rusk then wondered when we would be considering the budget. He did not pose the question directly, but one could gather that he would

also like to get some information on this subject from us as well. [Tr. note: The bracketed explanation is in the original.]

Rusk emphasized several times that his remarks did not mean the U S. government was now concluding some agreement with the Soviet government on this matter . It could not do this for the reasons that had already been set forth in talks with A. A. Gromyko. Nor could it guarantee that the figures Rusk intends to provide us soon in a strictly unofficial form would not be changed later in some way by the U.S. Congress itself, which constitutionally and traditionally

has its rights. But he, Rusk, is continuing to think about the usefulness of such an unofficial exchange of opinions “on mutual intentions.”

3. Having mentioned his remarks in the talks with A. A. Gromyko “on the subversive activities of Castro’s government,” Rusk asked me to convey to him in this connection, in a strictly personal, unofficial form, that it had been precisely determined that the three tons of weapons seized the other day in Venezuela had come from Cuba. (Rusk said: “We checked out in particular the numbers of the rifles purchased by Castro some time ago in Belgium and seized now in Venezuela”)

“I am saying this,” Rusk noted, “not as any representation or comment. Nor can this be the subject of an official talk between us, since Castro’s government exercises authority in its own country and it is unlikely that it consults with anyone when it decides to send weapons to one Latin American country or another, although the Chinese (Rusk added parenthetically, as it were) might be mixed up in this.” Rusk said in conclusion: “I by no means wish to exaggerate the significance of this incident in Venezuela, it’s not that great, but I would simply like to bring this last example to the attention of Mr. Gromyko, with whom I spoke about this matter before. Of course, I do not expect any answer in this matter, and please don’t mention in official conversations and talks what I said today. ”

I told Rusk that the latest events in Venezuela were well known, and if one were to speak frankly, they clearly showed the world once more that the Betancourt regime had no popular support, especially now, on the eve of elections; therefore, would it not be logical to expect (and judging from everything, this is indeed the case) that this regime is prepared to stage any provocation, even an international one, just to remain in power?

Rusk smiled but said nothing more.

A fair amount of time was devoted to discussing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, Rusk did not say anything new compared to his previous statements on this subject. I reiterated our position.

Rusk noted in the course of the conversation that the upcoming NATO meeting in

December of this year would be "routine in nature" and, judging from everything, issues relating to the establishment of NATO nuclear forces would basically not be discussed there (Rusk interjected that these issues "are generally discussed through other channels," but did not amplify on this theme).

Rusk said there were no plans yet for a trip to the upcoming NATO meeting by the new president, Johnson, but it has not been ruled out completely. "Evidently," Rusk said as though thinking out loud, "Johnson may instead travel to Europe this spring to meet with a number of heads of states that are U.S. allies. But for the time being, no meetings have been planned specifically between the new president and other heads of state, although there is agreement in principle about such meetings with some of them."

In conclusion, Rusk asked me again to consider our meeting unofficial, as if held "in a family atmosphere." The entire conversation was between the two of us; nobody else was in the office.

Rusk looks very tired; his eyes are red from sleeplessness ("I'm sleeping 3-4 hours a day right now," he remarked), but he himself is animated, in an obviously good mood, and gives the appearance of a person secure about his present position in spite of the change in presidents.

November 30, 1963

A. Dobrynin

REPORT: No. 1328 (outgoing no. 33600) of November 29, 1963. Comrade Gromyko said the embassy could give Rusk photocopies of the embassy's correspondence with Oswald, including his letter of November 9, but without waiting for a request by the U.S. authorities.

[Truncated handwritten number at top]

Workers of the world, unite !

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P140/XLI

To comrades Brezhnev, Podgomy, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Gromyko, Kuznetsov, and Semichastnyy

Excerpt from Protocol no. 140 of the meeting of the Presidium
of the CC CPSU held on April 23 , 1 964

Concerning the transmission to the U.S. State Department of photocopies of documents relating
to the stay of U.S. national Oswald in the Soviet Union.

1. Adopt the proposal of the MFA of the USSR and the KGB of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR to transmit to the U.S. State Department photocopies of certain documents relating
to the stay of U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union in 1959-1962, in accordance
with the appended list (appendix 1).

2. Approve the draft of the instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Washington for a
conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Rusk (appendix 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CC

Secret

Appendix 1

LIST

of Documents Relating to Lee H. Oswald's Stay in the Soviet Union,

Photocopies of Which are to be Turned over to the U.S. State Department

Materials on Lee H. Oswald's Residency and Employment in the Soviet Union

1. Lee H. Oswald's application of December 29, 1959, to the Division of Visas and

Registration of the UVD [Office of Internal Affairs] of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Municipal Council for a residency permit.

2. A declaration by Lee H. Oswald, dated January 5, 1960, that the legal status of the stateless person had been explained to him.
3. Lee H. Oswald's applications, dated January 4, 1961, and January 4, 1962, to the Police Administration of Minsk for extension of his residency permit.
4. A declaration by Lee H. Oswald, dated January 6, 1962, that he had received a residency permit.
5. An application and curriculum vitae written by Lee H. Oswald in connection with his taking a job at the Minsk Radio Factory; a card issued to the new employee, certifying that he had passed a medical examination and received instructions on safety procedures. Dated January 1, 1960.
6. A report from Lee H. Oswald's place of employment, dated July 15, 1961.
7. A report from Lee H. Oswald's place of residence, dated July 15, 1961.
8. A job evaluation for Lee H. Oswald from his employer, the Minsk Radio Factory, dated December 11, 1961.
9. An excerpt from Lee Oswald's workbook issued at the Minsk Radio Factory.

Materials Relating to the Departure of Lee H. Oswald and His Wife M. Oswald from the USSR

1. An application by Lee H. Oswald to the OVTR [Division of Visas and Registration] of the Police Administration of the Minsk Municipal Executive Committee for a visa to leave the USSR, dated July 15, 1961.
2. An application by Marina Oswald to the OVIR of the Police Administration of the Byelorussian SSR for permission for her husband, Lee H. Oswald, to leave the USSR, dated July 18, 1961.
3. Marina Oswald's application for a visa to leave the USSR, dated August 21, 1961.

4. Lee H. Oswald's commitment to provide financial support for his wife, written by him in connection with his departure for the U.S., dated July 17, 1961.

Materials of a Medical Nature

1. A history of Lee H. Oswald's illness, from the psychosomatic and surgical departments of the Botkin Hospital (Moscow); a history of illness and the medical record of Oswald's out-patient treatment from the Second Clinical Hospital in Minsk.

2. Marina Oswald's medical file and out-patient treatment record from Minsk

Re: Paragraph XLI of Protocol no. 140

Secret

Appendix 2

WASHINGTON

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

485. Visit U.S. Secretary of State Rusk and give him a note that reads as follows:

"The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to its note of March 24 of this year, has the honor to transmit, in connection with the request by the U.S. Government, photocopies of the following documents relating to the stay of U.S. national Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union in the 1959-1962 period:

Materials on Lee H. Oswald's Residency and Employment in the Soviet Union

1. Lee H. Oswald's application of December 29, 1959, to the Division of Visas and Registration of the UVD [Office of Internal Affairs] of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Municipal Council for a residency permit.

2. A declaration by Lee H. Oswald, dated January 5, 1960, that the legal status of the

stateless person had been explained to him.

3. Lee H. Oswald's applications, dated January 4, 1961, and January 4, 1962, to the Police Administration of Minsk for extension of his residency permit.

4. A declaration by Lee H. Oswald, dated January 6, 1962, that he had received a residency permit.

5. An application and curriculum vitae written by Lee H. Oswald in connection with his taking a job at the Minsk Radio Factory, a card issued to the new employee, certifying that he had passed a medical examination and received instructions on safety procedures. Dated January 1, 1960.

6. A report from Lee H. Oswald's place of employment, dated July 15, 1961.

7. A report from Lee H. Oswald's place of residence, dated July 15, 1961.

8. A job evaluation for Lee H. Oswald from his employer, the Minsk Radio Factory, dated December 11, 1961.

9. An excerpt from Lee Oswald's workbook issued at the Minsk Radio Factory.

Materials Relating to the Departure of Lee H Oswald and His Wife M Oswald from the USSR

1. An application by Lee H. Oswald to the OV1R [Division of Visas and Registration] of the Police Administration of the Minsk Municipal Executive Committee for a visa to leave the USSR, dated July 15, 1961.

2. An application by Marina Oswald to the OVIR of the Police Administration of the Byelorussian SSR for permission for her husband, Lee H. Oswald, to leave the USSR, dated July 18, 1961.

3. Marina Oswald's application for a visa to leave the USSR, dated August 21, 1961.

4. Lee H. Oswald's commitment to provide financial support for his wife, written by him in connection with his departure for the U.S., dated July 17, 1961.

Materials of a Medical Nature

1. A history of Lee H. Oswald's illness, from the psychosomatic and surgical departments of the Botkin Hospital (Moscow); a history of illness and the medical record of Oswald's out-patient treatment from the Second Clinical Hospital in Minsk.
2. Marina Oswald's medical file and out-patient treatment record from Minsk

Notify us by telegraph when this has been done.

[handwritten number: 155]

[handwritten: 375\illegible numbers/3-25-64 TOP SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WASHINGTON 14153 9 40 25 III 64

14171 14154

Special no. 485-487

URGENT

Today I visited Rusk at his request.

Rusk said that the U.S. government greatly appreciated the assistance the Soviet government had provided at its own initiative in the Oswald case by instructing the embassy to turn over copies of the correspondence between its consular section and Oswald and his wife in the 1962-1963 period. The U.S. government would be grateful if the Soviet government made available any additional information it has about Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from 1959 through 1962. The Warren Commission investigating the Oswald case has expressed in this connection a number of desiderata, which are appended to the note from the Secretary of State.

When handing over this note along with a copy of the letter from the chairman of the

Warren Commission, Rusk stressed that this request was confidential and that they realized its somewhat unusual nature, but they were guided by the gesture of good will manifested at the very beginning by the Soviet government. Of course. Rusk added, we are referring only to information in the hands of the Soviet authorities, because in certain areas (as the U.S. side understands) the Soviet side may not have it. Rusk noted as if in passing that during the Warren Commission's preliminary work a lot of data had come to light indicating Oswald's great mental instability

[Translator's note: in the Russian text, it appears that the word "psychological" has been overtyped by the word "mental. and that the same data might be available in the Soviet Union when Oswald lived there .

He went on to remark that for example, an American tourist who visited Oswald in the Soviet Union (in 1959, it seems) found him half-conscious in his room ("either he was drunk or having a fit, we don't know for sure," Rusk said, "since it was very fragmentary information I received a good deal later.")

In conclusion. Rusk re-emphasized the confidential nature of the request to the Soviet government and expressed the hope that it would correctly understand the reasons for this request.

(The text of the note and a copy of Warren's letter will be sent in a separate telegram.)

Before my departure. Rusk inquired if there was any new information from Moscow regarding the release of the U.S. airmen. I replied in the negative. As he was taking leave, Rusk noted in a half-jocular tone that the day before, when he was speaking at a congressional hearing (on a different issue altogether), one congressman, a member of that commission, called Rusk an "appeaser" for his Sunday press conference. I answered Rusk in the same vein that apparently said gentleman from Congress had not been particularly convinced by Rusk's presentation of the facts of the matter. Rusk just replied that during the press conference he had made every effort to stop the press from sensationalizing this incident.

On the way back from Rusk, my escort Mr. Guthrey [?], head of the State Department's Soviet desk, called my attention to the "good" editorial in the Washington Post about the incident with the PB-66 aircraft, intimating that the State Department had a hand in the affair (the article was transmitted over the TASS line). However, Guthrey [9] refrained from any further remarks

about the matter.

The embassy is now getting a fairly large number of telephone calls from newspapers and agencies concerning the exact date of the airmen's release. On the whole, the tenor of the commentaries and responses in the U.S. in regard to Rusk's statement about the Soviet side's intention to return the airmen is generally favorable to us.

March 24, 1964

A. Dobrynin

[Translator's note: The Russian rendering of the letter from Ambassador Foy Kohler to N.S. Khrushchev, dated September 28, 1964, conveys in all substantive respects the meaning of the original English text. The handwriting at the bottom of the Russian translation is partially illegible. The words "Comrade N.S. Khrushchev" and the date "9-30-64" are legible. The translation was done by the Office of Translations of the MFA of the USSR on September 29, 1964]

[handwritten number: 196]

THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ul. Chaykovskogo 19/21 Moscow, September 28, 1964

THE WARREN COMMISSION FINDS THAT OSWALD ACTED ALONE IN THE
KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

Washington, September 27, 1964

A special commission composed of eminent U.S. citizens has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone and not as "part of any domestic or foreign conspiracy," assassinated President Kennedy on November 22 last year.

In considering Oswald's motives, the commission could not reach a definite conclusion, but it noted various factors such as resentment toward any kind of authority, his obsessive desire to occupy a place in history, his propensity for violence, and his pronounced antagonism toward the United States.

The commission, headed by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, has also found that Oswald killed Dallas policeman J.D. Tippit when the latter approached him forty-five minutes after the assassination of President Kennedy.

The commission has also made a preliminary determination that Jack Ruby "acted independently" when he shot Oswald (whom he did not know) and killed him at a Dallas police station two days after the President's death.

The commission submitted its report to President Johnson last Thursday, and the White House made this voluminous document public on Sunday evening.

The report harshly criticized the carelessness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Dallas police, and recognized the need to improve measures for protecting American presidents.

The commission's investigation was the most thorough, complete, and objective in history. More than twenty-five thousand persons were questioned and some four thousand special reports comprising tens of thousands of pages were studied.

In summary, the commission found that Oswald had not known either Ruby or Tippit and that the latter two had not known each other.

The voluminous report, consisting of eight hundred eighty-eight pages, was the result of a ten-month investigation by a seven-member commission headed by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States. The work of the commission was the sole official and full investigation of the event.

Here is a brief presentation of the twelve conclusions that were reached by the commission and that are set forth in the report .

1. The shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded the governor of Texas, John

Connally, were fired from a window on the sixth floor on the southeastern corner of a building used as a school book depository.

2. The totality of the evidence indicates that three shots were fired. One of the shots missed, but the commission is not certain which shot it was.
3. There is convincing evidence presented by experts that the same bullet that pierced the President's neck also wounded Governor Connally. It was the first of two... [Translator's note: the sentence breaks off abruptly at the bottom of p. 1 of the Russian text]
4. The shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald.
5. Oswald killed Dallas policeman J.D Tippit approximately forty-five minutes after the assassination of the President.
6. Eighty minutes after the assassination of the President, and thirty-five minutes after the murder of Tippit, Oswald resisted arrest in a Dallas movie theater, trying to shoot another Dallas police officer.
7. Oswald was not roughed up by the police, although it was necessary to use force to arrest him. He was subjected to "hostile attacks" as a result of the "unhampered access" permitted to journalists to the area through which he was to pass during his transfer from a jail cell to another part of the building. Numerous statements, "sometimes erroneous," made by the police after his arrest would represent "serious obstacles" to ensuring a fair trial of Oswald.
8. Jack Ruby killed Lee Harvey Oswald. There are no data to indicate he was aided in this by any member of the police. But the Dallas police erred in trying to transfer Oswald to another prison "in full view of the public."
9. The commission found no evidence indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby was part of any domestic or foreign conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Moreover, the commission did not find any data indicating that any foreign government hired, influenced, or encouraged Oswald, according to the report.
10. Throughout the investigation, the commission did not discover any evidence pointing to a conspiracy, subversive activity, or disloyalty towards the U.S. government on the part of any federal, state, or local officials.
11. Oswald acted alone. As regards his motives, the report does not reach a definite

conclusion, but notes various factors such as his resentment towards all authority, his obsession to occupy a place in history, his propensity for violence, and his pronounced antagonism toward the United States.

12. Measures taken to protect the President must be improved.

The conclusions reached by the commission should dispel all rumors and speculation that the assassination of the President might be connected with some conspiracy. The group of eminent American citizens, all of whose members are legal scholars, have devoted thirty-one pages of the report's appendix to a point-by-point refutation of the various speculations that have been made. Each of these hypotheses was carefully examined in the course of the exhaustive investigation.

The commission was appointed on November 29 last year by President Johnson to gather facts relating to the assassination of President Kennedy and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald and to report them to the "American people and the entire world."

When the commission presented its report to President Johnson last Thursday, he noted that the commission members were guided in their efforts by "a firm resolve to determine and publish the whole truth about these terrible events."

"It is our duty," he said, "to the good name of the United States and to all people throughout the world who respect our nation, and especially to the memory of President Kennedy."

In the final section of the voluminous report, the commission points out that its conclusions are based on all the factual data it obtained in the course of completely unhindered investigations.

The report states: the commission "conducted its own investigations, and all government institutions fully met their obligations regarding cooperation in the conduct of the commission's investigations."

"These conclusions," the commission states later on in the report, "represent a balanced and well considered judgment by all the members of the commission and were submitted after an

investigation, whose results satisfied the commission that it had succeeded in ascertaining, to the extent possible, the real events that took place in the assassination of President Kennedy through a lengthy and careful analysis of the facts.”

The report contains a brief description of events beginning with the arrival, on November 22, of the airplane of President Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy, and their escorts at Love[?] airport in Dallas up to the murder of Oswald by Jack Ruby two days later. Following this are the commission’s main conclusions and its recommendations on how to improve measures for ensuring the President’s security.

Further on, the report devotes entire chapters (going into meticulous detail and using photographic illustrations) to important events, and presents excerpts from the testimony of witnesses as well as data concerning: the President’s assassination itself; the shots from the Texas School Book Depository; the murderer, detention, and death of Oswald; the investigation of information about a conspiracy; Oswald’s past and his possible motives; ensuring the President’s security.

Almost half of the report consists of appendices, which present information on the commission’s establishment, members, and work methods. The appendices also contain medical

reports, data on the results of autopsies, a report on Lee Harvey Oswald’s interrogation by the Dallas police, biographies of Oswald and Jack Ruby, and even an analysis of Oswald’s financial situation from June 13, 1962, to the date of the assassination.

The report also states that on the morning of the day of the assassination. President Kennedy spoke with Mrs. Kennedy and presidential assistant Kenneth O’Donnell about the risk faced by the president during public appearances.

According to O’Donnell, the report says, the President noted: “If anyone really wanted to shoot the U.S. president, it wouldn’t be very hard to do. A person would just have to go up a high building, armed with a rifle with a telescopic sight. And nobody could do anything to prevent it.”

The commission adduces a tremendous amount of evidence, eyewitness testimony, and statements by witnesses to corroborate its main conclusions.

The fact that the assassin fired shots from a window located in the southeastern corner on the sixth floor of the School Book Depository is partially established in the testimony of eyewitnesses who saw that the rifle shots had been fired from that window. "Almost the whole" bullet, which was found on the stretcher of Governor Connally at Parkland Hospital, and two bullet fragments discovered in the President's car had issued from a 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Camo rifle found on the sixth floor of the depository; this "rules out any other weapon." Three used shells discovered near the window had been ejected from that same rifle. The nature of the bullet wounds found on both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, along with the place where the President's car was located at the time of the shooting, show that the shots came from above and from the rear in relation to the President's car.

The number of empty shells was one of the factors that led the commission to conclude that there were three shots. "Most likely," the report states, "all the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally were made by two bullets. The second bullet, in all probability, passed by the President's automobile, hitting neither the car nor those sitting in it." According to the most precise calculations, all three shots were fired in a period of time lasting approximately from four and eight-tenths to slightly over seven seconds."

The commission had a number of solid reasons for concluding that Oswald was the President's assassin.

The rifle that fired the shots "belonged to Oswald and was owned by him [sic]." He brought it into the depository building on the morning of the day of the assassination. At the moment of the assassination he was by the window from which the shots came. Soon after the assassination the rifle was found on the sixth floor, and the paper bag in which he had brought the rifle into the depository was found near the window. On the basis of testimony by experts and their analysis of films made during the passage of the motorcade, the commission concluded that a shooter possessing Oswald's "ability" could have fired that number of shots in the established period of time. On April 10, 1963, he had tried to kill Major General Edwin A. Walker, "thereby proving his propensity for murder." The report emphasizes that no proof was found that Oswald or Ruby participated in "any domestic or foreign conspiracy seeking to assassinate President Kennedy."

In this connection, the commission "thoroughly investigated" all the circumstances

surrounding the planning of the motorcade route, the hiring of Oswald by the Texas School Book

Depository on October 15, 1963, the means whereby the rifle was brought into the building, the placement of boxes of books near the window, Oswald's escape from the building, and testimony

by eyewitnesses to the assassination.

The commission also investigated Oswald's financial situation and his connections, as well as his personal habits, particularly during the period after his return to the U S. from the Soviet Union in June 1962.

The commission concluded that there were no grounds to believe that Oswald "was in the service of any foreign government or was influenced or encouraged by any foreign government,"

or that he was the agent of a foreign government.

The commission investigated all of Oswald's attempts to "identify" with various political groups in the United States, e.g., the Communist Party, the so-called Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and the Socialist Workers Party. However, the commission found no evidence that the ties established by Oswald had any relation to the assassination.

The report further says that no one confirms the allegation that Oswald was an "agent serving as an informer" of the CIA, the FBI, or any other government agency.

"The commission has not found any direct or indirect link between Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby," the report says. "Nor could it find any reliable proof that they knew each other,

although there was a thorough investigation of the numerous rumors and allegations of a connection between them." Nor is there any evidence that Ruby and police officer Tippit knew each other or that Oswald and Tippit knew each other."

Ruby was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death for killing Oswald. He appealed the sentence.

The commission delved deeply into the motives that led Oswald to commit his heinous crime, but did not find a completely satisfactory explanation for them. The commission expressed

the following ideas on this matter:

" The motivation that led Oswald to [commit] the assassination was undoubtedly based on

many factors, and the commission does not believe it is possible to ascribe to him any one motive

or set of motives. It is obvious, however, that the motives actuating Oswald arose largely from his hostility to his environment. He was obviously unable to establish sound relations with other people. He was in a state of permanent discontent with the surrounding world.”

“Long before the assassination, he had voiced hatred for American society and actively expressed his protest. Oswald’s aspiration for what he considered the ideal society was doomed to fail from the outset. He wanted to occupy a place in history, to play the role of a “great man” who had won universal acclaim, a man before his time. His adherence to marxism and communism was evidently also an important factor in his motivation. He had previously demonstrated his ability to act decisively, regardless of consequences, when such action helped to attain his objective at a specific moment. All these factors, and many others that had formed the character of Lee Harvey Oswald, created a person capable of assassinating President Kennedy.”

In regard to the murder of police officer Tippit, the report says that there were two eyewitnesses to the murder, and seven witnesses heard shots and saw the shooter leave the scene of the crime.

All nine “positively identified” Lee Oswald as this person. The shells found at the scene of the policeman’s murder had been shot from the revolver Oswald was carrying at the time of his arrest. He had purchased this revolver and it belonged to him. Oswald’s jacket was found on the escape route of the person who had shot and killed the policeman.

In regard to Oswald’s interrogation and detention in jail, the commission says he was not physically abused by the police. He was informed that he could not be forced to testify and that

any testimony he gave could be used against him in court. He was also told of his right to the services of a lawyer. The Bar Association of Dallas offered Oswald its services, which he declined at the time.

The commission says that the “unhampered access” given to representatives of the media to that part of the prison through which Oswald had to pass in order to get to other parts of the building resulted in chaotic conditions, which were not conducive to proper handling of the interrogation and protection of the prisoner’s rights.

Moreover, according to the Commission the numerous and occasionally erroneous statements made by the local police authorities to journalists “would have created serious

obstacles to an impartial trial of Oswald.”

The commission recommends that measures for protecting the president be revised, taking into account the facts discovered in the course of this investigation.

The report states that the difficulty of the presidential office has increased so much in recent years that the Secret Service was unable to prepare and provide adequate personnel and necessary equipment “in order to perform its important task.”

The commission believes there is a lack of communication and coordination between the Secret Service and other federal agencies charged with the president’s security.

Although certain measures taken by the Secret Service, such as at Love [?] Airport and the trade center building in Dallas, were “carried out well,” the commission believes that the methods of finding the assassin, who was in a building on the route of the President’s motorcade, were inadequate.

Within the limits of these “limitations,” the commission says, the agents directly responsible for the president’s security reacted immediately when the assassin’s shots were fired.

Further on, the commission expressed “satisfaction” that after several months’ work, the Secret Service prepared a document containing plans for improving the technical side of the Secret Service and enhancing its capacities.

The commission proposes that the Secretary of the Treasury designate a special assistant tasked with monitoring the work of the Secret Service. It also proposes that a committee composed of members of the government, including the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Secretary of Justice or of National Security, be entrusted with overseeing the activities of the Secret Service and other federal agencies that help to protect the president.

In a special appendix meant to lay to rest the allegations and rumors engendered by the assassination, the commission notes that “myths” have traditionally surrounded all tragic assassinations in history.

“When there is an element of mystery in such dramatic events, mistaken conclusions often arise as a result of sensationalistic allegations” says the commission’s report.

The commission says that many questions have arisen about the facts, because of the “genuine bewilderment or disinformation that surrounded some of the early information on quickly developing events.”

A “large number” of rumors and allegations were investigated in almost all parts of the United States and in most of the continents of the world, according to the report. It further says that the special appendix is meant to introduce clarity into the most widespread public notions about the facts.

Here are some examples of allegations, together with the commission’s conclusions:

Allegation: The shots that killed the president were fired from a railroad bridge over a three-tier highway viaduct.

The commission’s conclusion: The shots that hit the President’s neck and head and that wounded Governor Connally were fired from the rear and from above. There are no data [indicating] that any of the shots was fired at the president from any other place than the Texas School Book Depository.

Allegation: A rifle cartridge was found on the bridge.

The commission’s conclusion: No cartridge of any type was found on the bridge, and there was no witness claiming to have found one.

Allegation: More than three shots, perhaps as many as five or six, were fired at the President and Governor Connally.

The commission’s conclusion: “The totality of the evidence indicates that three shots were fired, two of which hit President Kennedy. There is convincing evidence on the part of the experts that one of these two bullets also hit Governor Connally. Certain witnesses stated that

they heard more than three shots, but as was fully described in Chapter 3 of the report, the great majority heard three shots.”

Allegation: The President’s throat wound was the result of a shot from the front, according to doctors at Parkland Hospital.

The Commission’s conclusion: The doctors at Parkland Hospital initially thought that the head wound could have been an entry or exit wound, but they did not conduct an examination to determine entry and exit wounds. Later on, when the data of the medical examination were

received, the doctors at Parkland Hospital concluded that it was an exit wound.”

Allegation: Oswald could not have known the motorcade route before he came to work on November 22.

The commission’s conclusion: “The motorcade’s route was published in both of the Dallas newspapers on November 19 and was therefore known at least seventy-two hours before Oswald came to work on November 22.”

Allegation. There is evidence a second rifle was discovered on the roof of the School Book Depository or on the bridge.

The commission’s conclusion: A second rifle was not found in any of the known places or in any other place. The shots that hit President Kennedy and Governor Connally were fired from the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository.”

Allegation: Oswald could not have had enough time to make all the movements attributed to him from the moment he left the Texas School Book Depository up to his meeting with Tippit.

The commission’s conclusion: “A check of the time of all of Oswald’s movements determined that these movements could have been made in the time at his disposal.”

Allegation: Oswald was trained by the Russians at a special school for political assassins in Minsk.

The commission’s conclusion: “The investigators appointed by the commission did not find proof confirming this allegation or the existence of such a school in Minsk during Oswald’s stay there. Oswald belonged to a hunting club near Minsk, but there is nothing to indicate it was anything but an ordinary hunting club.”

Allegation: Ruby and Oswald were seen together at the Carousel Club.

The commission’s conclusion: “All allegations that Oswald was seen in Ruby’s company or in anyone else’s company at the Carousel Club were thoroughly investigated. None of them deserves credence.”

Allegation: Oswald or his accomplices had prepared his escape on an airplane from an airport in the Dallas area.

The commission's conclusion: "An investigation of such allegations showed that they are completely groundless. The commission found no evidence that Oswald had made any plans to flee after the assassination."

This information bulletin is being distributed by the U.S. embassy in Moscow The Soviet embassy in Washington enjoys the same privileges.

[Truncated handwritten number at top]
Workers of the world, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P170/18

TOP SECRET

To comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Gromyko, and Kuznetsov

Excerpt from Protocol no. 17 of the meeting of the Politburo
of the CC CPSU held on August 22, 1966

Concerning an oral representation to the U S. embassy in Moscow

Approve the draft of the oral representation to the U.S. embassy in Moscow in connection with their distribution of the so-called Report of the Committee Appointed by the President to Investigate the Case of President John F. Kennedy's Assassination (appended).

SECRETARY OF THE CC

[Translator's note: The phrase in the left margin of the Russian text reads:
"To be returned within 7 days to the CC CPSU (General Division, Sector 1)"]

Re: Paragraph 18 of Protocol no. 17

Draft of an oral representation to the
U S. embassy in Moscow

In February 1965, the U.S. embassy's attention was called to material published in issue no. 101 of the magazine America concerning Lee Oswald, who was charged with the assassination of President Kennedy. This article cited statements attributed to Oswald that were disrespectful towards the Soviet people and our country. The embassy was advised that its publication and dissemination of such materials in the USSR could not be permitted.

However, we have learned that the U.S. embassy is presently sending to numerous Soviet institutions and individuals the so-called Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Case of President Kennedy's Assassination, which cites even more abundantly statements ascribed to Oswald that are insulting to the Soviet people.

In addition, the aforementioned report contains much speculation on whether "Soviet agencies" were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Irrespective of the negative conclusion that the report's authors finally reach, the very posing of such a question and the various speculations surrounding it are completely inappropriate and impermissible. Just as absurd and outrageous are the report's allegations that "an important factor in the causal chain of phenomena that led Oswald to assassinate the President" was his "devotion to marxism and communism."

The Ministry suggests that the U.S. embassy immediately stop distributing the above-mentioned report.